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1. Introduction 
According to Stephen Darwall’s Second-Personal Account, moral obligations implicate a distinct 
class of practical reasons, “second-personal reasons”, whose “validity depends on presupposed 
authority and accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the 
reason’s being addressed person-to-person” (Darwall 2006: 8). In other words, obligations con-
stitutively involve persons’ legitimate demands on one another. 
Darwall cites Kant as his philosophical ally. Indeed, he argues that Kant’s project of deriving 
moral obligations from the form of practical reason cannot succeed unless it invokes the notion 
of a second-personal reason. In this paper, I discuss the arguments of Darwall’s Kantian critics, 
who object that the Second-Personal Account abandons central tenets of Kant’s moral theory. 
In a nutshell, these critics argue that, in Kant’s moral theory, moral consideration of others is 
downstream of the moral law, whose source resides in pure practical reason alone. They con-
clude that Kant’s moral theory is decidedly first-personal, not second-personal. 
 
1 For helpful feedback, I am grateful to Rowan Cruft, Stephen Darwall, Michael Gregory, Suzanne Jacobi, 
Pauline Kleingeld, Stefano Lo Re, Ben Sachs, Jens Timmermann, Fiorella Tomassini, an audience at the 
conference Humanity and Personality in Kant at the University of Lisbon, and two anonymous reviewers. 
 
I use the following abbreviations for (and translations of) Kant’s works: G for Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals (Kant 2011); CPrR for Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1996); MM for Metaphysics of 
Morals (Kant 1996); Rel for Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason (Kant 2009). 
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I argue that the Second-Personal Account is more congenial to Kant’s moral theory than these 
critics suppose. I respond to the three main challenges to the Second-Personal Account’s Kant-
ian credentials. My responses show that these challenges are based on misunderstandings of the 
Second-Personal Account. Understood correctly, this account is not only compatible with the 
central tenets of Kant’s moral theory, but also illuminates some aspects of this theory which have 
hitherto received scant attention. In particular, it sheds new light on the relationship between 
respect for persons and respect for the law in Kant’s theory, by inspiring the reading that, on this 
theory, the law is the formal principle of the person. 
I start by outlining the Second-Personal Account (Section 2). Subsequently, I respond to the 
three main challenges to this account’s Kantian credentials. The first challenge is the objection 
that, for Kant, moral obligations are based on the principle of pure practical reason, not on the 
demands of others (Section 3). The second challenge consists in the accusation that the Second-
Personal Account narrowly construes moral obligations on the model of perfect duties to others, 
or even duties of right, and therefore cannot accommodate features of Kant’s moral theory that 
stem from its agent-centered orientation, namely the primacy of duties over rights, imperfect 
duties, and duties to oneself (Section 4). The third challenge is that Kant takes the ultimate 
object of the feeling of respect to be the moral law, not persons (Section 5). I end by arguing that 
the Second-Personal Account is not only compatible with the central tenets of Kant’s moral the-
ory, but also promises to shed new light on some of its features (Sections 6). 
2. The Second-Personal Account 
Darwall’s Second-Personal Account invokes a conceptual link between obligation and account-
ability: an agent is obligated to φ if and only if she can legitimately be held accountable for failing 
to φ without excuse. Importantly, this need not mean that the agent can be punished or other-
wise sanctioned if she fails to φ (Darwall 2006: 250). Instead, it means that failure to live up to 
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her obligations makes it apt to adopt certain types of reactive attitudes, such as blame and re-
sentment, towards the agent (also see Strawson 1962). The relevant types of reactive attitudes 
implicitly address a claim or demand to the agent, summoning her to act in a certain way. In 
Darwall’s words, they come with “an implicit RSVP” in that they “aim to draw [the agent] into 
an exchange that will constitute their being held accountable” (2006: 145). 
Darwall argues that the only way to account for the conceptual link between obligation and 
accountability is to recognize that an act’s being obligatory is grounded in facts about relations 
of authority and accountability. More specifically, the normative reasons implicated by moral 
obligations are second-personal in that their “validity depends on presupposed authority and 
accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the reason’s being 
addressed person-to-person” (Darwall 2006: 8). This implies that the authority to hold an agent 
accountable for compliance with her obligations is an irreducibly second-personal, practical au-
thority. It is irreducibly second-personal in that the reason it addresses constitutively involves 
the relation of authority and accountability between the addresser and the addressee. It is prac-
tical in that it “creates a distinctive reason for compliance” (2006: 11). Although the content of 
our obligations is of course partly informed by substantive considerations, such as how our ac-
tions affect persons’ well-being, Darwall thinks that these considerations are relevant only inso-
far as they authorize demands. Darwall tentatively suggests that they do so if and only if they 
pertain to persons’ interests qua beings with second-personal authority (2006: 309-10). 
Darwall argues that the Second-Personal Account vindicates Kant’s claim that the Categorical 
Imperative is the supreme principle of moral obligation. His argument depends on the observa-
tion that “second-personal address”, the activity of addressing a second-personal reason by mak-
ing a demand, is subject to “normative felicity conditions” (2006: 5). These are conditions that 
must be met for an instance of second-personal address to succeed at addressing a second-per-
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sonal reason. And crucially, according to Darwall, these conditions coincide with Kant’s condi-
tions of the possibility of moral obligation: autonomy of the will and the supreme authority of 
the Categorical Imperative (2006: 275). 
Darwall’s argument for this claim starts from his observation that, when we hold someone ac-
countable for complying with her obligation to φ, we must implicitly presuppose that she can 
hold herself accountable for failing to φ without excuse. The reason is that holding an agent 
accountable differs in important ways from coercing or otherwise “goading” him (Darwall 2006: 
49-52). In goading an agent, we are attempting to get him to act in a certain way by announcing 
that we will act in a way or bring about a state of the world that he regards as desirable (or 
undesirable) if he complies (or fails to comply). That is, we are appealing to the ways in which 
the agent evaluates actions or states of affairs independently of our authority to address him. By 
contrast, when we hold an agent accountable, we are trying to influence his behavior by getting 
him to appreciate, freely and rationally, the legitimacy of our demand. 
This observation can be illustrated with one of the examples that Darwall uses (2006: 5-10). Sup-
pose one person, Arnold, is standing on top of the foot of another person, Bella. Darwall’s ob-
servation is that, when Bella demands that Arnold remove his foot from on top of hers, thus 
holding him to his obligation to do so, she implicitly presupposes that Arnold can demand this 
of himself. 
Now, according to the Second-Personal Account, when Bella holds Arnold accountable, she ad-
dresses a second-personal reason to him. That is, she addresses a reason to him which would 
not exist “but for her authority to address it” (Darwall 2006: 13). From this, in conjunction with 
the difference between holding accountable and goading, Darwall concludes that by addressing 
Arnold second-personally, Bella is trying to get him to determine himself, freely and rationally, 
by her authority to address him in this way. Thus, Bella’s demand presupposes that Arnold can 
internalize Bella’s authority within his deliberation. But this means that her demand must be 
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addressable from a perspective that Bella and Arnold, addresser and addressee, can share 
(Darwall 2006: 111-15).  
This shared perspective is what Darwall calls the “second-person standpoint” (2006: 114). This 
standpoint facilitates a mode of reasoning that is irreducibly second-personal in that it is guided 
exclusively by the shared second-personal authority of persons. For Darwall, it is this authority, 
not a substantive value or normative requirement, that our dignity as persons most fundamen-
tally consists in (2006: 13-14). Crucially, Darwall contends that a demand is addressable from the 
second-person standpoint if and only if it is warranted by the Categorical Imperative (2006: 275-
76). Accordingly, he contends that “second-personal competence”, the capacity to determine 
oneself by demands addressable from within the second-person standpoint, involves autonomy 
of the will (ibid.). 
His argument for this contention emphasizes that, as a corollary of the second-personal nature 
of accountability, holding persons accountable presupposes “that there was a process of reason-
ing they could have engaged in by which they could have held themselves responsible and de-
termined themselves to act as they should have” (2006: 241). Since this process of reasoning is 
supposed to be determined solely by our shared authority as participants in second-personal 
address, Darwall argues that it must proceed independently of the content of particular demands 
(2006: 275). Instead, it must be guided by the question of what participants in second-personal 
address as such can demand of one another. Therefore, according to Darwall, second-personal 
competence involves autonomy of the will, which Kant defines as “the characteristic of the will 
by which it is a law to itself (independently of any characteristic of the objects of willing)” (G 
4:440). Thus, Bella’s demand presupposes that Arnold is capable of  determining himself by the 
mere form of law, and thus of following the Formula of Universal Law: “act only according to 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). 
What is more, this capacity must be realized when Arnold acts on Bella’s demand; that is, the 
obligation that Bella’s demand addresses must be underpinned by the Categorical Imperative. 
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In this way, the Second-Personal Account purports to vindicate Kant’s claim that our moral ob-
ligations derive from a “formal” rather than a “material” principle of the will, which commands 
that we choose our maxims as if we were thereby at the same time making laws for all persons 
at all times (CPrR 5:19-30, Darwall 2006: 275). Darwall writes (2006: 101): 
[N]orms of moral obligation are “laws” for a “kingdom of ends”, which structure and de-
fine the equal dignity of persons as beings who may not be treated in some ways and 
must be in others and who have equal standing to demand this second-personally of one 
another. 
Yet, it is important to note that Darwall does not claim that the Second-Personal Account is 
identical to Kant’s moral theory. He claims that his account supports Kant’s moral theory. In-
deed, he even claims that Kant needs the Second-Personal Account (2006: ch. 9, 2009). For 
Darwall thinks that his analysis of obligations in terms of second-personal reasons is the only 
way to establish the link between moral obligation on the one hand and the twin notions of the 
Categorical Imperative and autonomy of the will on the other hand. But this means that, to the 
extent to which Kant can be read as attempting to vindicate autonomy and the Categorical Im-
perative without appealing to the notion of a second-personal reason, Darwall also distances 
himself from Kant. 
To appreciate how Darwall sees his relation to Kant, it helps to consider Kant’s fact-of-reason 
argument. This argument purports to vindicate autonomy of the will and the Categorical Imper-
ative on the basis of our consciousness of being bound by the moral law. Kant invites us to im-
agine an agent whose prince threatens to have him executed unless he “give[s] false testimony 
against an honorable man” (CPrR 5:30). Kant argues that, while the agent may or may not suc-
cumb to the prince’s threat, he would have to admit that he can resist it. The reason is that the 
agent realizes that he ought to resist the threat, and ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. But, according to Kant, 
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the agent can refuse the prince’s demand only if he possesses autonomy of the will. And if he 
possesses autonomy of the will, then he is bound by the Categorical Imperative. 
Whether Darwall can endorse this argument depends on how the ‘ought’ that the agent recog-
nizes—the alleged “fact of reason” (CPrR 5:31)—is interpreted (see Darwall 2006: 235-42). If this 
‘ought’ is interpreted as implicating an obligation in the irreducibly second-personal sense, 
Kant’s argument is not only compatible with but supported by the Second-Personal Account. 
For, by recognizing that he is obligated to resist the prince’s threat in this sense, the agent also 
recognizes that he can be held accountable for doing so from within the second-person stand-
point. And, as we have seen, Darwall thinks that this recognition indeed presupposes that the 
agent possesses autonomy of the will. 
By contrast, if the ‘ought’ in question is interpreted more broadly, as reflecting some sort of 
normative reason or requirement, where this does not already entail the agent’s accountability 
for resisting the prince’s threat, then Darwall rejects Kant’s fact-of-reason argument.  Suppose 
the ‘ought’ is read as merely reflecting the sort of reason that we need in order to count as acting 
at all. According to Darwall, this cannot establish the agent’s autonomy of the will because we 
can count as acting without being guided by reasons that purport to derive their normativity 
from the form of our will (Darwall 2006: 222-29, pace Korsgaard 1996, 2007). For example, we 
can intelligibly act for reasons that purport to be normative solely by virtue of intrinsic features 
of the actions or outcomes that they favor. Alternatively, suppose the ‘ought’ invoked by the fact-
of-reason argument is taken to invoke a normative requirement akin to a Rossian prima-facie 
duty. Since such a requirement purports to bind us by virtue of intrinsic features of the actions 
it requires or forbids, the agent’s ability to act on them does not require autonomy either 
(Darwall 2006: 239, see Ross 2002). For critical discussions Darwall’s rejection of these interpre-
tations of the fact-of-reason argument, see Grenberg (2013: ch. 9), Korsgaard (2007), Pauer-Stu-
der (2010), Schapiro (2010) and Timmermann (2014: 142-45). For replies to some of these, see 
Darwall (2007, 2010b). 
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Thus, the Second-Personal Account approves of the fact-of-reason argument, but only if it is 
interpreted second-personally. Since the fact-of-reason argument always proceeds from the first-
person standpoint of an individual agent, it follows that the Second-Personal Account does not 
rule out a first-personal vindication of Kant’s moral theory. Indeed, the second-person stand-
point is a first-person standpoint (Darwall 2007: 55). What the Second-Personal Account rules 
out is a “merely first-personal” vindication of Kant’s moral theory, i.e., one that proceeds from a 
standpoint which is not already colored, so to speak, by the agent’s place in relations of authority 
and accountability (Darwall 2006: 10, italics added). 
Insofar as Kant himself does not explicitly rely on the conceptual link between obligation and 
accountability, the Second-Personal Account must be taken to at least add something to the 
Kantian tradition. The remainder of this paper is concerned with the question of whether the 
Second-Personal Account thereby also abandons central aspects of Kant’s moral theory, as 
Darwall’s Kantian critics argue. 
3. The Source of Obligations 
The first challenge to the thesis that the Second-Personal Account is congenial to Kant’s moral 
theory is posed by the argument that, for Kant, moral obligations have their source, not in per-
sons’ authority, but in pure practical reason. As Oliver Sensen puts it (2011: 121, italics added): 
Making a claim does not by itself generate an obligation for the agent. For Kant, the 
bindingness arises through the qualification of the claim as a universal law, as com-
manded by the Categorical Imperative. 
Sensen concludes that “[i]n this sense, Kant’s ethics is not second-personal” (ibid: 120). Since the 
moral law is the formal principle of the agent’s own practical reason, the ultimate source of our 
moral obligations is in pure practical reason rather than in the claims or demands of others. 
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Sensen’s objection presupposes a voluntarist reading of the Second-Personal Account. According 
to this reading, Bella’s demand that Arnold remove his foot, by itself, puts Arnold under an ob-
ligation to remove his foot. However, the voluntarist reading is not correct. Darwall does not 
depict the demands of persons as giving rise to moral obligations by themselves. To the contrary, 
as I explained in the previous section, he takes the Categorical Imperative and autonomy of the 
will to “mediate second-personal relations” as “the necessary conditions for the possibility of 
second-personal authority” (2006: 242). 
Again, the Second-Personal Account is not identical to Kant’s view, because it regards obligation, 
the Categorical Imperative, and autonomy as importantly linked to accountability. This is the 
sense in which, according to Darwall, “the dignity of persons” is “the fundamental moral notion” 
(2006: 242). But this does not commit him to abandoning Kant’s claim that obligations have 
their source in pure practical reason. For Darwall does not conceive of the dignity of persons as 
a substantive value or a set of normative requirements that binds us independently of the formal 
principle of practical reason. Any claims that persons can legitimately make on us presuppose 
our second-personal competence, and thus our autonomy, as a necessary condition of the pos-
sibility of their second-personal authority (Darwall 2006: 242). Contrary to what Sensen seems 
to think, Darwall agrees with Kant that “I can recognize that I am under obligation to others 
only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation” (MM 6:417-18, Darwall 2006: 248, 
note 9, pace Sensen 2011: 122).  
4. Rights and Duties 
The next challenge to the thesis that the Second-Personal Account is congenial to Kant’s moral 
theory consists of a bundle of three separate objections. What these objections have in common 
is that, in one way or another, they are motivated by the assumption that the Second-Personal 
Account takes a specific subset of obligations as its paradigm. In particular, they assume that the 
Second-Personal Account narrowly focuses on obligations that we owe to others such that others 
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can in some sense exact their fulfilment from us. Within Kant’s moral theory, these obligations 
correspond to the category of perfect duties to others or, perhaps even more narrowly, to those 
duties that can be enforced, namely duties of right. Whether all perfect duties to others are also 
duties of right is a complicated exegetical issue that I cannot address here (see, e.g., Willaschek 
1997). 
On the basis of this assumption, the three objections accuse the Second-Personal Account of 
abandoning features of Kant’s moral theory that stem from its agent-centered orientation. These 
features are the primacy of duties over rights, imperfect duties, and duties to oneself. I respond 
to the three objections by challenging the assumption that the Second-Personal Account takes 
a narrow subset of duties as its paradigm. 
The clearest and most comprehensive statement of the three objections is provided by Jens Tim-
mermann (2014). For this reason, my discussion in this section directly responds to his argu-
ments. I should note that Timmermann himself entertains the possibility that these arguments 
presuppose a reading of the Second-Personal Account that does not reflect Darwall’s own view 
(Timmermann 2014: 146-147). However, this reading of the Second-Personal Account seems to 
be widely shared in Kantian practical philosophy. Among Kantians, it is commonly assumed 
that, by definition, only duties to others are second-personal (see, e.g., Bacin 2015: 105, Ebels-
Duggan 2009: n. 36, Flikschuh 2017: ch. 3, n. 29, Ripstein 2009: ch. 5, n. 1). Some authors even 
explicitly tie the Second-Personal Account to the sphere of juridical duties, as opposed to mo-
rality as whole (see, e.g., Flikschuh 2017: ch. 3, n. 29, Pauer-Studer 2010: 300-2, Ripstein 2009: ch. 
5, n. 1). By discussing Timmermann’s arguments, I thus take myself to be addressing a view that 
is held by a sizeable group of theorists. 
4.1 The Primacy of Duties 
The first feature of Kant’s agent-centered system that the Second-Personal Account is accused 
of failing to accommodate is the primacy of duties vis-à-vis rights (Timmermann 2014: 136-137). 
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Kant provides the following brief argument for the claim that duties are prior to rights (MM 
6:239): 
[W]e know our own freedom (from which all moral laws, and so all rights as well as 
duties proceed) only through the moral imperative, which is a proposition commanding 
duty, from which the capacity for putting others under obligation, that is, the concept of 
a right, can afterwards be explicated. 
According to Kant, then, we do not find out about our duties by attending to others’ rights. 
Instead, we encounter our duties directly within our own practical consciousness, in the form of 
an imperative, and only against this background can others intelligibly assert their rights.  
As Kantian theorists have criticized, recent theories of human rights tend to ignore this point by 
regarding rights as prior to duties (Hope 2013, O’Neill 1996). Although Darwall does not primar-
ily frame his position in terms of rights, Timmermann contends that the Second-Personal Ac-
count “parallels” these theories because it regards “moral obligations as based on second-per-
sonal claims” (Timmermann 2014: 136). I want to call this supposed parallel into question. It rests 
on the assumption that the type of second-personal authority that Darwall takes to be constitu-
tive of moral obligations plays the same role within the Second-Personal Account as rights do 
within Kant’s moral system. To see what this assumption amounts to, let us briefly recapitulate 
Kant’s account of rights. 
For Kant, rights belong to the domain of juridical lawgiving, which he distinguishes from ethical 
lawgiving (MM 6:218-221). Ethical or internal lawgiving pertains directly to maxims, ends and 
incentives, and only indirectly to actions. More specifically, to fulfil an ethical duty, it is not 
enough to perform a certain action; it is also necessary that one performs it from the right mo-
tivation, namely from the feeling of respect for the moral law. Accordingly, ethical duties cannot 
be enforced. If an agent performs the required action from an “external incentive”, such as the 
fear of punishment, her determining ground is not the moral law but some contingent desire 
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(ibid.). By contrast, juridical or external lawgiving is concerned solely with external actions. Ac-
cordingly, juridical duties can be enforced; all that counts is that the agent perform the required 
action, not that she be guided by a specific maxim, end or incentive. Indeed, for Kant, the notion 
of right is conceptually tied, not only to the possibility, but to the justification of coercion: “Right 
and authorization to use coercion therefore mean one and the same thing” (MM 6:231).  
Kant also thinks that juridical duties belong to the sphere of duties that are owed to someone 
(MM 6:227, see Ripstein 2009: 109, Timmermann 2014: 136). In the current literature, such duties 
are commonly referred to as directed duties, or duties to someone, because their violation is not 
only wrong but wrongs someone. In sum, then, to say that Bella has a Kantian right against Ar-
nold that he remove his foot is to say that Arnold has a juridical duty, owed to Bella, to remove 
his foot. And this, in turn, means that Bella (or the state) is authorized to make Arnold remove 
his foot by force. 
How do Kantian rights compare to Darwallian second-personal authority? Here, it is important 
to note that Darwall distinguishes between two types of second-personal authority, which cor-
respond to two types of obligation (2013b: 27-28). “Individual” authority corresponds to directed 
obligations. If A has an obligation to φ which is owed to B, then B has individual authority over 
that obligation, which enables B to waive that obligation. If B does not waive A’s obligation, and 
A fails to φ without excuse, then it is apt for B to resent A. By contrast, “representative” authority 
corresponds to obligations which are not owed to anyone in particular, instances of what Darwall 
calls “moral obligation period” (2013b: 20). This is an authority that anyone has as a representa-
tive member of the moral community. Representative authority does not include the power to 
waive any obligations. Instead, it is exhausted by the standing to adopt reactive attitudes like 
blame and indignation towards agents who violate the corresponding obligations. According to 
Darwall, by adopting these reactive attitudes, “we add our voice to or second, as it were, a de-
mand that we must presuppose is made of everyone by the moral community or representative 
persons as such” (2013b: 37). 
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If one is looking for the equivalent of Kantian rights in Darwall’s framework, individual second-
personal authority is the most natural candidate. For one thing, like Kantian rights, individual 
authority corresponds to directed obligations. For another, both Kantian rights and individual 
authority are discretionary—while Kantian rights are attached to the option to enforce an obli-
gation, individual authority comes with the option to waive an obligation. Indeed, Darwall thinks 
that individual authority is necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, for having a right (2013b: 
28, note 10). Thus, if Darwall held that individual authority is prior to moral obligations, his 
account would perhaps seem to parallel the view that rights are prior to duties. To the contrary, 
however, Darwall argues that representative authority, and thus moral obligation period, is prior 
to individual authority (2013b: 38-39).  
To illustrate this, let us return to the case of Arnold and Bella. Arguably, Arnold’s obligation to 
remove his foot is owed to Bella. Accordingly, Bella has individual authority over this obligation. 
But, as we saw in Section 2, Bella’s authority to make demands on Arnold presupposes that Ar-
nold can address these demands to himself from within the second-person standpoint. However, 
a demand is addressable from within the second-person standpoint only if all persons, qua par-
ticipants in second-personal address, can legitimately hold each other accountable for compli-
ance with it, when placed in the relevant circumstances (Darwall 2006: 59). Accordingly, the 
authority that Arnold exerts over himself when he holds himself accountable is not individual 
authority but the authority of a representative member of the moral community. It follows that 
Bella’s individual authority over Arnold presupposes Arnold’s representative authority over him-
self. Crucially, this also means that Bella’s individual authority presupposes that it would be 
wrong period if Arnold failed to withdraw his foot. In other words, Bella’s individual authority 
presupposes that Arnold is under a moral obligation period to withdraw his foot (Darwall 2013b: 
39). 
We have seen that, while individual authority might seem to correspond to Kantian rights, this 
is not the type of second-personal authority that the Second-Personal Account regards as prior 
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to moral obligation. What about representative authority? I argue that, while representative au-
thority is in a sense prior to moral obligations within the Second-Personal Account, this does 
not threaten the Kantian doctrine of the primacy of duties. The reason is that the role played by 
representative authority and the associated reactive attitudes within the Second-Personal Ac-
count is different from the role played by rights, and the activity of claiming them, within Kant’s 
moral theory.  
As noted above, Kantian rights belong to the domain of juridical lawgiving, which is conceptually 
linked to the authorization of coercion. Therefore, claiming a Kantian right necessarily involves 
an invocation of the authorization to use coercion. It can also involve appealing to the agent’s 
respect for the moral law, and thus to her autonomy of the will, but it need not (MM 6:232). This 
is because coercion provides a sufficient incentive to fulfil a juridical duty, which is after all only 
concerned with external actions (see MM 6:219). Consequently, claiming a Kantian right can in 
principle be an instance of the goading type of behavior which Darwall distinguishes from gen-
uine second-personal address. As I explained in Section 2, when we goad an agent, we aim to get 
her to act in a certain way, by appealing to the agent’s independent evaluation of states of affairs.  
By contrast, when we hold an agent accountable by adopting reactive attitudes like blame or 
indignation towards her, thus invoking our representative authority to demand that she φ, we 
presuppose that any second-personally competent being, including the agent herself, could 
make the same demand of her. But, according to Darwall, this in turn presupposes that our de-
mand is warranted by the Categorical Imperative and that, consequently, the agent could com-
ply with it by determining herself by the mere form of law. Far from invoking an external au-
thority and incentive, then, representative authority directly appeals to the agent’s internal mo-
tivational capacities, particularly her will’s capacity to be a law to itself. 
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4.2 Imperfect Duties 
The second agent-centered feature of Kant’s moral theory that the Second-Personal Account 
allegedly abandons is the category of imperfect duties (Timmermann 2014: 133-136). The differ-
ence between perfect and imperfect duties is that, while perfect duties prohibit all maxims that 
would have us perform a certain act-type, ψ, imperfect duties command the adoption of a certain 
maxim (see MM 6:390). As a result, a perfect duty yields one and the same token obligation (not 
to ψ) under all circumstances. Imperfect duties, by contrast, only provide “grounds of obligation” 
that need to be applied to a given set of circumstances to determine which token obligation they 
yield, if any (MM 6:224, see Timmermann 2013). Following Timmermann, I am here distinguish-
ing between “duties”, understood as “general prescriptive laws or rules that provide the matter 
of what ought to be done” and “obligations”, understood as “individual cases of being morally 
bound to do something” (Timmermann 2013: 42-43, also see MM 6:222). 
Timmermann argues that Kantian imperfect duties “sit uneasily with second-personal claims” 
because “for Kant rightful second-personal claims are indigenous to the sphere of strict or jurid-
ical duty” (Timmermann 2014: 134). Here, Timmermann again assumes that second-personal au-
thority plays the role of Kantian rights. Consequently, he assumes that the Second-Personal Ac-
count characterizes “censure” or “punishment” as appropriate responses to the violation of any 
obligation (ibid.). Timmermann rightly points out that this view of moral obligations cannot 
accommodate imperfect duties because, unlike the performance or omission of external acts, 
the adoption of a maxim cannot be effected from the outside, as it were. He writes (Timmermann 
2014: 135): 
When I decide to comply with an imperfect obligation I must do so, in a strong sense, of 
my own accord. That is why I acquire some ‘merit’ with regard to the beneficiary […], 
and why he owes me gratitude in return. 
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Now, I already rejected the assumption that second-personal authority corresponds to Kantian 
rights in the previous subsection. The type of second-personal authority which the Second-Per-
sonal Account takes to be prior to moral obligations does not essentially involve an appeal to 
external coercion. Instead, it is the authority to adopt reactive attitudes like blame, which di-
rectly appeal to autonomy of the will, and thus summon the agent to comply ‘of her own accord’. 
Now, Timmermann thinks that even blame is an inappropriate response to the violation of an 
obligation of imperfect duty (2014: 134-135). However, Timmermann is not using “blame” in the 
same sense as Darwall. Timmermann supposes that an agent is blameworthy for ψ-ing only if ψ-
ing renders her an overall “evil or vicious” person (2014: 135). By contrast, Darwall writes that 
“[r]eactive attitudes […] concern themselves not with a person’s overall agency, but specifically 
with his conduct with respect to claims or demands that other persons have standing to make 
of him” (Darwall 2006: 80). Thus, even if Timmermann is right to note that blame in his sense is 
an inappropriate response to the violation of an imperfect duty, it does not follow that blame in 
the sense invoked by the Second-Personal Account is an inappropriate response. 
One might nevertheless wonder if the Second-Personal Account can accommodate the link be-
tween imperfect duties and gratitude. According to Kant, if an agent fulfils her imperfect duty 
(e.g., of beneficence) with respect to some particular person (e.g., by aiding her), then that per-
son owes gratitude to the agent (G 4:430, MM 6:448, 6:452-455). But, Timmermann asks, “[w]hy 
should anyone be grateful to a benefactor who is merely responding to pre-existing second-per-
sonal claims” (2014: 135)? 
In response, I want to note two things. First, accommodating the link between imperfect duties 
and gratitude is not especially challenging for the Second-Personal Account. How hard it is to 
accommodate this link depends, not on whether we adopt the Second-Personal Account, but on 
how we interpret Kant’s account of imperfect duties. To see this, compare what we may call the 
Strict Reading and the Lax Reading. On the Strict Reading, which is favored by Timmermann, 
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imperfect duties generate token obligations that are just as “unconditional” and “non-negotia-
ble” as those generated by perfect duties (Timmermann 2014: 135, also see 2005). If the Strict 
Reading is correct, the Second-Personal Account implies that we are accountable for fulfilling 
the token obligations generated by imperfect duties, i.e., we are blameworthy if we violate them 
without excuse. This might seem to pose a challenge when it comes to accommodating the link 
between imperfect duty and gratitude. However, this challenge is no more serious than the chal-
lenge that the Strict Reading, by itself, generates. After all, saying that an agent deserves grati-
tude for doing what she had an “unconditional”, “non-negotiable” obligation to do is no less 
problematic than saying that an agent deserves gratitude for doing what she was accountable for 
doing. On the Lax Reading, by contrast, imperfect duties are significantly less demanding than 
perfect duties (see Hill 2002). On this reading, imperfect duties make room for actions that are 
good but not obligatory. If this is correct, then the Second-Personal Account does not imply that 
our imperfect duties render us accountable for acting in some specific way. Accordingly, there 
is also no challenge regarding the link between imperfect duty and gratitude on this reading. 
Second, the challenge regarding the link between imperfect duties and gratitude that—suppos-
ing the Strict Reading is true—arises for the Second-Personal Account is not as serious as it 
might seem. When Timmermann formulates this challenge, he seems to assume that gratitude 
is an appropriate response to an agent’s φ-ing only if the agent would not be blameworthy for 
failing to φ without excuse. However, this assumption seems false. Suppose that I could save a 
child’s life at no significant cost to myself. Suppose further that, by doing so, I would be neither 
violating any perfect duty nor neglecting any of my imperfect duties. On the Strict Reading, my 
imperfect duty of beneficence generates a token obligation to rescue the child under these cir-
cumstances (see Timmermann 2005: 20-21, 2014: 134). It seems to follow that I violate my imper-
fect duty of beneficence if I fail to rescue. Accordingly, it seems plausible that I will be blame-
worthy for failing to help without excuse. Yet, it also seems appropriate (for the parents of the 
child, at least) to show gratitude towards me if I save the child. Hence, the fact that gratitude 
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can be an appropriate response to an agent’s φ-ing in a situation where, according to the Second-
Personal Account, the agent would have been blameworthy for failing to φ without excuse is not 
a reason to reject the Second-Personal Account. This seemingly contradictory constellation of 
attitudes is not just an implication of the Second-Personal Account (when conjoined with the 
Strict Reading) but a feature of our actual moral practice. 
Timmermann might respond that, while I would be blameworthy in this situation, the reason is 
not that I fail to help on this particular occasion but that—as my failure to help reveals—I have 
adopted a maxim of never helping others, which makes me “morally vicious” (2014: 135, note 11). 
I have two replies. First, as I noted above, Timmermann is not using “blame” in the same sense 
as the Second-Personal Account. Hence, even if I am not blameworthy for failing to help in Tim-
mermann’s sense, I might still be blameworthy in Darwall’s sense. Second, the Second-Personal 
Account can concede that, strictly speaking, blame is occasioned by an agent’s will rather than 
by her external acts (see Darwall 2008: 195). In any case, this does not seem to decrease the 
tension between our judgments of blameworthiness and the aptness of gratitude. 
4.3 Duties to Oneself 
The third aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy that the Second-Personal Account is accused of 
abandoning by virtue of its supposed association with a narrow subset of duties is the category 
of duties to oneself (Timmermann 2014: 131-133). In Kant’s moral system, duties to oneself paral-
lel, in structure and importance, duties to others. 
In a sense, duties to oneself are even more important than duties to others. After all, according 
to Kant, “I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time 
put myself under obligation” (MM 6:417-418). However, this sense of ‘duties to oneself’ is to be 
distinguished from the one that is relevant here: while in this wide sense all duties are ultimately 
duties to oneself, the sense that is relevant here serves to contrast duties “to ourselves” from 
19 
 
those “to other human beings” (G 4:421). What is more, I already showed that the Second-Per-
sonal Account can accommodate duties to oneself in the wide sense in Section 3. 
About the prospect of accommodating duties to oneself within the Second-personal Account, 
Timmermann writes (2014: 132): 
As the name indicates, duties to oneself are irreducibly first-personal. They need not 
involve any person other than the agent. Moreover, they solely depend on the agent’s 
will and cannot be externally enforced. […] They are not second-personal. 
Now, I have already shown that the Second-Personal Account is not committed to the external 
enforceability of all obligations. One might nevertheless wonder how duties to oneself could be 
second-personal given that, as Timmermann notes, they need not involve another person. How-
ever, as I noted in Section 3, the Second-Personal Account claims that obligations presuppose 
the agent’s ability to hold himself accountable for complying with them. This implies that sec-
ond-personal address does not require interaction with another person. As Darwall puts it, “‘sec-
ond person’ does not entail ‘second party’” (2010a: 217). 
Yet, the possibility of addressing ourselves second-personally might not seem to show that the 
Second-Personal Account can accommodate duties to oneself. For all that has been said so far, 
this kind of self-address might simply be the internal counterpart, a mere reflection, of our du-
ties to others. What might seem to be missing is a demonstration that the Second-Personal Ac-
count can attribute symmetrical roles, in moral reasoning, to ourselves and other persons. How-
ever, it is not clear why the Second-Personal Account should not be able to do so. As Timmer-
mann notes, by endorsing the Categorical Imperative as the supreme principle of morality, this 
account seems committed to this symmetry (2014: 132).  
What is more, Darwall endorses the Kantian duty to avoid servility (see MM 6: 434-437). He 
writes that “[g]iving little weight to one’s own wishes and values, by being inappropriately def-
erential to those of others, can be […] a failure to respect ourselves” (Darwall 2013c: 121, also see 
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Darwall 2008: 193-94). And, indeed, this seems to follow from the Second-Personal Account. To 
see this, recall that, for Bella’s demand of Arnold to be legitimate, Arnold must be able to address 
this demand to himself from within the second-person standpoint. And this, in turn, gives rise 
to a legitimate demand on Arnold’s part: that demands made of him be justifiable from within 
the second-person standpoint (Darwall 2006: 271-74). Thus, one way for Arnold to act contrary 
to what is justifiable from within the second-person standpoint—and thus to act wrongly—is to 
neglect a demand of Bella’s that he can address to himself. But another way to act wrongly is to 
comply with a demand of Bella’s that he cannot address to himself and which, to the contrary, 
he can demand not to be subject to. 
Finally, the possibility to hold ourselves accountable through attitudes of self-reproach seems to 
suggest that obligations owed to ourselves are congenial to the Second-Personal Account. In-
deed, several theorists, myself included, invoke the Second-Personal Account in arguments for 
the possibility and existence of obligations to oneself (Cholbi 2015, 2018, Rosati 2011, Schaab 2019, 
2020, Schofield 2015, 2019). 
5. Respect 
The third challenge to the thesis that the Second-Personal Account is congenial to Kant’s moral 
theory is concerned with the feeling of respect, which arises from our awareness of the principle 
of pure practical reason and serves as the motive for actions done from duty.  
To discuss the role of respect within Kant’s moral theory, it is helpful to introduce Darwall’s 
distinction between two kinds of respect (1977, 2006: 122-126). Appraisal respect amounts to “an 
assessment of someone’s conduct or character or of something that somehow involves these” 
(2006: 122). In the case of morality, we respect someone in the appraisal sense when we judge 
them to be a morally good agent (ibid.). Recognition respect, by contrast, “concerns not how 
something is to be evaluated or appraised, but how our relations to it are to be regulated or 
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governed” (2006: 123). Relatedly, “[t]he object of recognition respect is not excellence or merit; 
it is dignity or authority” (ibid.). 
As I explain in more detail below, Darwall’s claim that the vindication of the Categorical Imper-
ative must proceed via the notion of second-personal authority, implies that the motive of duty 
involves recognition respect for persons. However, some theorists argue that, for Kant, the mo-
tive of duty is recognition respect for the law, not for persons (see e.g., Timmermann 2014: 138-
140, Sensen 2011: 118-122). Their arguments can be summarized as follows. Whenever Kant men-
tions respect for persons, the kind of respect he has in mind is either appraisal respect or some-
thing else altogether, but not recognition respect. For example, when Kant writes that “[a]ll re-
spect for a person is actually only respect for the law (of righteousness etc.) of which he gives us 
the example”, he is saying that we respect others in the appraisal sense insofar as they display a 
morally good character (G 4:401, footnote). And when Kant introduces “duties of respect for 
other human beings”, he is using “respect” in an altogether different sense (MM 6: 465). After 
all, Kant is not here concerned with a feeling of respect, i.e. a recognition or appraisal of an 
authority or quality that persons have. By contrast, he is concerned with the way the moral law 
commands us to treat or regard persons. Accordingly, the “respect” involved in duties of respect 
does not play the role of motivating moral action in general. Instead, it is but one part of the 
content of the moral law.  
One way to reply to these arguments is by providing textual evidence that Kant himself appeals 
to recognition respect for persons after all (see, e.g., Darwall 2008). However, I pursue a different 
strategy here. I argue that, regardless of whether Kant’s own writings feature recognition respect 
for persons, this notion is philosophically congenial to Kant’s moral theory. Indeed, there is rea-
son to think that Kant is independently committed to viewing the motive of duty as recognition 
respect for persons as well as the law. My argument unfolds in two steps. In this section, I show 
how the Second-Personal Account abandons the dichotomy between respect for persons and 
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respect for the law. In the next section, I show how Kant might be independently committed to 
a similar view. 
The Second-Personal Account abandons the dichotomy between respect for persons and respect 
for the law by depicting the motive of duty as a feeling of recognition respect both for persons 
and for the law. While the Second-Personal Account acknowledges that the feeling of respect 
arises from the agent’s encounter of the moral law within her own practical reason, it asserts 
that this encounter must involve the agent’s awareness of being accountable for acting on the 
moral law. On the Second-Personal Account, this link to accountability is part of the very con-
cept of moral obligation and plays an essential role in vindicating the Categorical Imperative as 
the supreme moral principle. Therefore, according to the Second-Personal Account, recognition 
respect for the moral law, as a matter of conceptual entailment, is recognition respect for the 
equal second-personal authority of all members of the moral community. 
One might wonder how it is even possible that respect for the law is respect for persons. At first 
glance, respect for the law involves submission under a principle, not recognition of others. 
Here, it is crucial to understand that the moral community, according to the Second-Personal 
Account, is not a group of concrete individuals. Darwall writes (2007: 64): 
[T]he moral community as I understand it is not any actual community composed of 
actual human beings. It is like Kant’s idea of a “realm of ends,” a regulative ideal that we 
employ to make sense of our ethical thought and practice. 
To see this, recall that an agent is accountable for complying with a demand only if she can hold 
herself accountable for complying with it from within the second-person standpoint. But this, in 
23 
 
turn, implies that she is accountable for complying with the demand only if any second-person-
ally competent being as such could hold itself accountable for complying with it. This evokes 
Kant’s notion of the kingdom of ends (G 4:438): 
[The dignity of the rational being] brings with it that it must always take its maxims from 
the point of view of itself, but also at the same time of every other rational being as leg-
islating (which are therefore also called persons). Now in this way a world of rational 
beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, and possible through 
their own legislation of all persons as members.  
To say that to respect the law is to respect the second-personal authority of the moral commu-
nity, then, is not to say that the motive of duty comes down to respect for the contingent, em-
pirical demands made by actual human beings. Rather, it comes down to respect for autonomy 
of the will, and thus—given that autonomy amounts to the capacity to co-legislate from a shared 
second-personal perspective—to respect for the equal dignity of all second-personally compe-
tent beings as such. 
Indeed, on the Second-Personal Account, person is an irreducibly second-personal concept, too: 
to be a person just is to have the authority to demand compliance with principles that are justi-
fiable from within the second-person standpoint (Darwall 2006: 80, 126). Thus, the concept of 
the person forms part of an “interdefinable circle” of “irreducibly second-personal concepts”, 
which includes the concepts of legitimate demand and second-personal authority (2006: 11-12). 
This is what most fundamentally underpins the Second-Personal Account’s identification of re-
spect for the law with respect for persons. If the law is the principle of obligation, where obliga-
tion is conceptually tied to our accountability, which is in turn conceptually tied to persons, then 
to respect the law just is to respect persons. Indeed, we might say that the law is the formal 
principle, not only of practical reason, but also of the person.  
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One might object that, while respect for the law might involve respect for persons indirectly, 
respect for the law does not seem to relate us to persons directly. However, even when we en-
counter the moral law within our own practical reason, without being addressed by another, we 
address ourselves by invoking the representative authority of persons as such. We might say we 
are addressed by the very idea or form of the person.  
To conclude, the Second-Personal Account undermines the dichotomy between respect for per-
sons and respect for the law. This account implies that the motive of duty involves not only 
recognition respect for the law, but also—and precisely because it involves recognition respect 
for the law—recognition respect for persons.  
6. Persons and the Law 
According to the Second-Personal Account, the motive of duty is a feeling of recognition respect 
for the law as well as for persons. This suffices to show that this account does not abandon Kant’s 
view that the motive of duty is respect for the law. I now want to argue that, in addition, there 
is good reason to think that Kant himself is independently committed to the notion that the 
motive of duty involves respect for persons as well as for the law. 
As we saw in the previous section, some authors argue that respect for others figures in Kant’s 
moral theory only in two ways. First, there is a feeling of appraisal respect for the morally good 
actions of others. Second, there is a duty to respect others, which does not command a feeling 
but a certain way of treating or regarding others. This picture suggests that persons relate to the 
law only as agents who are subject to it (and can acquire merit by complying with it) and as 
patients, whom the law are marks out for a certain kind of treatment or regard. 
However, this picture does not exhaust the ways in which persons relate to the law in Kant’s 
system. A maxim is compatible with the law if and only if it is compatible with the autonomy of 
all persons, not because that happens to be the content of the law, but because of what kind of 
principle the law is: the formal principle of a unified plurality of autonomous wills, “a merely 
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possible kingdom of ends” (G 4:439). After all, Kant arrives at the Categorical Imperative by ask-
ing what principle could function as a universal law, and thus a law for a potential manifold of 
reasoners (G 4:402). Thus, other persons do not enter moral reasoning only in a second step, as 
it were. We might say that persons, qua rational beings endowed with autonomy, are instances 
of the law. This suggests that, although persons’ demands do not create obligations by them-
selves, they do not merely serve to remind us of our obligations either (pace Sensen 2011: 121). 
This strongly suggests that recognition respect for the law is ipso facto also recognition respect 
for persons. In a similar vein, Francey Russell argues that, while only the law exacts respect, the 
law “shows up both in the form of [the] agent’s own reason and in the form of other persons” 
(2020: 274). 
Indeed, there is good reason to think that Kant is also committed to the idea that the law is the 
formal principle of the person. To see this, it is important to understand in what sense the moral 
law is the formal principle of an autonomous will. The law is constitutive of the activity of au-
tonomous willing in the sense that, if one were not guided by the moral law, one would not 
count as engaging in this activity. After all, autonomy is “the characteristic of the will by which 
it is a law to itself” (G 4:440, italics added). Thus, unlike other candidate moral principles, such 
as the principle of utility, the moral law is not an external standard against which our maxims 
and actions are to be measured. Instead, it is an internal standard of autonomous willing, a 
standard that the autonomous will as such strives to comply with (see Reath 2013: 223, Sensen 
2011: 109-111). This is why the law “commands neither more nor less than just this autonomy”; it 
commands that the autonomous will live up to its own ambition of being a law to itself (G 4:440). 
Since it is the possession of an autonomous will that distinguishes “persons” from “things”, this 
suggests that the law is the formal principle of the person (G 4:428). Indeed, Kant writes, “[t]he 




One might object that, while there is a sense in which Kant regards the moral law as the formal 
principle of the person, this does not warrant the conclusion that recognition respect for the law 
amounts to recognition respect for persons. In some passages, Kant seems to use “personality” 
and related terms to denote a characteristic of agents who comply with the moral law. For ex-
ample, in the second Critique, he writes (CPrR 5:87, italics added):  
This idea of personality, awakening respect by setting before our eyes the sublimity of 
our nature (in its vocation) while at the same time showing us the lack of accord of our 
conduct with respect to it and thus striking down self-conceit, is natural even to the most 
common human reason and is easily observed. 
Similarly, in the Religion, Kant reserves the term “personality” for an agent whose “power of 
choice” is determined by the law (Rel 6:27). He writes (ibid., italics added):  
[S]ince this becomes possible solely through the free power of choice's admitting the 
moral feeling into its maxim, the constitution of such a power of choice is a good 
character. 
According to the present objection, while the law is constitutive of personhood, persons are 
nevertheless to be respected in the appraisal sense only. For the passages above suggest that 
“personality” denotes a good moral character, and thus something to be achieved, rather than a 
standing or authority that all persons as such have.  
However, this line of objection creates a puzzle: why does Kant label the phenomenon in ques-
tion “personality” rather than “moral goodness”? The view that the law is the formal principle of 
the person more generally (as opposed to the morally good person only) accounts for the pas-
sages quoted above in a way that solves this puzzle. If striving to comply with the moral law is 
what makes someone a person, moral goodness is the constitutive aim of personhood. We might 
then say that an agent who achieves moral goodness thereby realizes his personhood, and thus 
attains personality in the fullest sense. In this view, although only personality in this fullest sense 
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is an appropriate object of appraisal respect, the moral law is constitutive of personhood in gen-
eral. Accordingly, persons in general are appropriate objects of recognition respect. Indeed, this 
view parallels Sensen’s account of the related concepts of autonomy, dignity, and ends-in-them-
selves as involving two stages: initial and realized (2011: 169).  
Before I conclude, it is worth noting that the idea that the law is the formal principle of the 
person also sheds light on Kant’s account of conscience. He writes (MM 6:438): 
[Conscience] is peculiar in that, although its business is a business of a human being with 
himself, one constrained by his reason sees himself constrained to carry it on as at the 
bidding of another person. 
This passage suggests that the moral law itself, when encountered within our own practical rea-
son, takes the guise of a person. If the law is the formal principle of the person, this should not 
surprise us. 
I do not claim that Kant is committed to the view that the law is the formal principle of the 
person for the same reason as the Second-Personal Account. I only tried to show that the Second-
Personal Account’s commitment to this view, by itself, need not constitute a departure from 
Kant’s moral theory. Furthermore, my argument in this section suggests that the Second-Per-
sonal Account illuminates some hitherto underexamined elements of Kant’s moral theory. 
7. Conclusion 
The Second-Personal Account is not identical to Kant’s moral theory. However, it is far more 
congenial to Kant’s views than Darwall’s Kantian critics believe. First, it does not abandon the 
Kantian notion that moral obligation has its source in pure practical reason. It rather supple-
ments that notion with the claim that pure practical reason is inseparably tied to relations of 
accountability. Second, it accommodates agent-centered features of Kant’s moral theory, such 
as the primacy of duties over rights, imperfect duties, and duties to self. Third, it is compatible 
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with the identification of the motive of duty with respect for the law. Indeed, the Second-Per-
sonal Account even sheds new light on Kant’s own view by serving as an inspiration for the 
interpretation that the moral law is the formal principle of the person and, therefore, to respect 
the law is to respect persons. 
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